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Abstract We study the effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribu-
tion mechanism games. As in previous experiments, we study four- and eight-person
groups in high and low marginal per capita return (MPCR) conditions. We find a
positive effect of group size in the low MPCR condition, as in previous experiments.
However, in the high MPCR condition we observe a negative group size effect. We
extend the design to investigate two- and three-person groups in the high MPCR con-
dition, and find that cooperation is highest of all in two-person groups. The findings in
the high MPCR condition are consistent with those from n-person prisoner’s dilemma
and oligopoly experiments that suggest it is more difficult to sustain cooperation in
larger groups. The findings from the low MPCR condition suggest that this effect can
be overridden. In particular, when cooperation is low other factors, such as consid-
erations of the social benefits of contributing (which increase with group size), may
dominate any negative group size effect.
Keywords Voluntary contribution mechanism · Cooperation · Group size
JEL Classification C72 · H41
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article
(doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9382-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized
users.
D. Nosenzo · S. Quercia · M. Sefton (B)
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
e-mail: martin.sefton@nottingham.ac.uk
D. Nosenzo
e-mail: daniele.nosenzo@nottingham.ac.uk
S. Quercia
e-mail: simone.quercia@nottingham.ac.uk
Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size 5
1 Introduction
The voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) has become a widely used experi-
mental framework for studying cooperation. In typical experiments participants are
assigned to n-player groups. Each group member is endowed with tokens and chooses
how many to place in a private account, from which that person earns α money units
per token, and how many to place in a group account, from which every person in
the group earns β money units per token. Parameters are chosen so that private and
collective interests are in conflict: the group maximizes earnings by contributing all
tokens to the group account (nβ > α), but each group member has a private incentive
to place her tokens in her private account (α > β). This task is then repeated over a
number of periods.1
One factor that might be expected to affect contributions to the group account is
the size of the group. Previous VCM studies have found that, if there is an effect of
group size, it is in the direction of higher contributions in larger groups (see Sect. 2
for a review). An explanation for this finding can be based on the private and social
costs and benefits of a contribution. For each token contributed to the group account a
contributor incurs a cost of α and a benefit of β money units regardless of group size,
whereas the social benefits of the contribution, n times β money units, increase with
group size. If individuals care about more than just own earnings, and instead inter-
nalize some of the social benefits of contributing, they may be willing to contribute
more in larger groups where the social benefits are larger.
Interestingly, findings from other experimental settings where there is a tension
between private and collective interests, such as n-person prisoner’s dilemma or
oligopoly experiments, suggest that increasing the size of the group may have a neg-
ative impact on cooperation, as subjects find it more difficult to attain collectively
optimal outcomes in larger groups. For example, Marwell and Schmitt (1972) and
Bonacich et al. (1976) study n-person iterated prisoner’s dilemmas where they vary n
while keeping constant the private and social costs and benefits of cooperating.2 They
find that cooperation rates are lower in larger groups. Numerous subsequent studies
report further evidence that cooperation is inversely related to group size, usually us-
ing groups of size between two and seven, although, as Kollock (1998) notes in a
review of this literature, in some studies the decrease in cooperation as group size
increases tapers off quickly.3
1The framework in which tokens are allocated between private and group accounts was introduced by
Marwell and Ames (1979); Isaac et al. (1984) modified their design to introduce the version described
above. See Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) for reviews of experiments using this framework.
2Marwell and Schmitt (1972) compare two- and three-person prisoner’s dilemma games, while Bonacich
et al. (1976) study three-, six- and nine-person games. In both studies payoff matrices are chosen so that
cooperating rather than defecting decreases own payoff, and increases total payoff, by the same amount
across games.
3Not all studies, however, have investigated the effect of group size on cooperation while keeping constant
the private and social incentives to cooperate (e.g., Komorita and Lapworth 1982; Grujic´ et al. 2012). In
some studies, as in Bonacich et al. (1976)’s ‘Rule A’ experiments, the social benefits of the contribution
increase with group size, akin to the VCM setting, and group size is found to have a positive effect on
contributions.
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Similarly, a large literature on experimental oligopolies finds that cooperation (i.e.
collusion) is more difficult in larger groups (i.e. when there are more competitors).
For example Fouraker and Siegel (1963) examine the textbook Bertrand model under
duopoly and triopoly treatments. Although equilibrium predictions are the same for
both treatments, prices are higher among duopolies. Similarly, Dolbear et al. (1968)
study a model of price competition with differentiated goods where equilibrium pre-
dictions are independent of the number of competitors, and they too find prices to
be higher in smaller markets. Relatedly, Isaac and Reynolds (2002) design two- and
four-firm posted-offer markets with capacity constraints so that benchmark predic-
tions (competitive, collusive, Cournot-Nash) are comparable, and find that prices are
higher in two-firm markets. Other studies examine models where equilibrium predicts
a numbers effect. Even here, there is evidence of a negative effect of group size on
collusion beyond that predicted. Huck et al. (2004), for instance, study the textbook
homogeneous goods Cournot model with two, three, four or five firms per market,
where the equilibrium prediction is that quantities are higher in larger markets. In the
experimental two-firm markets there is evidence of collusion and firms produce less
than the Nash level. As the number of firms increases markets become more compet-
itive and firms tend to produce even more than the Nash level. Orzen (2008) studies
a price-competition setting where standard theory predicts that expected prices in-
crease with the number of firms in the market. In the experiment he finds the opposite
effect: outcomes are more collusive in two- than four-firm markets.
There are several possible explanations for these negative effects of group size on
cooperation. One is based on the idea that a number of factors conducive to cooper-
ation, such as social pressure and social incentives, may be more effective in small
than larger groups (Olson 1965). Other authors (Marwell and Schmitt 1972) have
suggested the ‘bad apple’ hypothesis. Many individuals are willing to cooperate, but
only as long as others do so as well. Thus, if a group contains one non-cooperator
(a ‘bad apple’) cooperation will unravel. In a population containing a fixed propor-
tion of non-cooperators larger groups are more likely to unravel. Another possibility
is that, as discussed by Kim and Walker (1984), individuals in small groups have a
greater perception that their free-riding may have an impact on others’ willingness to
cooperate in the future.
These considerations suggest that the observed group size effects in VCM ex-
periments reflect a combination of factors that may operate in opposite directions.
A positive effect of group size stems from the increased social benefits from a con-
tribution, while a negative effect stems from the difficulty of sustaining cooperative
outcomes in larger groups. This led us to conjecture that the moderately positive ef-
fects observed in previous VCM experiments may reflect the focus of the literature
on groups of four or more players, which in the standard VCM setup is already suffi-
ciently large to make it difficult to sustain cooperation, and where the positive effects
may dominate. We conjectured that the negative effect of group size may be more
evident in smaller groups, while the positive effect is more evident in larger groups.
To test these conjectures we compare cooperation rates in VCM experiments vary-
ing the number of players matched into a group. As in the previous VCM literature
on group size effects, we also vary the marginal per capita return from contributions
to the group account (MPCR = β/α): either low (0.3) or high (0.75). For both low
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and high MPCR we compare four- and eight-person groups, as in previous studies.
For the high MPCR setting we extend the analysis to smaller groups of two and three
players.4
As in previous studies, in our low-MPCR treatments we observe a significantly
positive effect of group size on contributions. This positive effect is already evident
in the first period of the experiment where contributions are 12 % higher in eight- than
four-person groups. In both treatments contributions steadily decline across periods,
but we do not observe a faster unraveling of cooperation in larger groups. The picture
is different in the high-MPCR treatments. Here initial contributions are around 75 %
of endowments in all treatments. However, treatments differ in how cooperation un-
ravels across periods, with contributions declining faster in larger groups. The overall
effect of group size on cooperation is negative: average contributions are highest in
two-person groups and lowest in eight-person groups, with contributions in three-
and four-person groups taking intermediate values.
Thus, in our VCM experiments we observe both a positive and negative effect
of group size on cooperation. However, contrary to our initial conjecture, whether
the positive or negative effects dominate does not seem to depend on the size of the
group: in our high-MPCR treatments we do observe a negative effect of group size
on cooperation also for groups of four or more players. Rather, our findings sug-
gest that which effect dominates depends on how conducive the VCM environment
is to cooperation. In settings that are particularly conducive to cooperation (like our
high-MPCR treatments) contributions are already high, and there is limited scope for
improving on such high levels of cooperation. Here the negative effects of group size
are more evident as the initially high cooperation levels deteriorate faster in larger
groups. In contrast, in settings that are unfavorable to cooperation (like our low-
MPCR treatments) there is more scope for group size to have a positive effect on
initial cooperation, and less scope for it to affect the decline of contributions over
time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review
previous evidence on group-size effects in VCM experiments. In Sect. 3 we describe
our experimental design and procedures. In Sect. 4 we present the results, and Sect. 5
concludes.
2 Group size effects in previous VCM experiments
We are aware of six previous studies that have systematically examined the effects
of group size in VCM games holding other game parameters constant. These studies
are listed in Table 1, along with the MPCR and group sizes used in each treatment.
We also report the average contributions as a percentage of endowments and levels
of statistical significance.5
4Note that it is not possible to study two- or three-player VCMs in our low-MPCR condition as in such
groups cooperation would be in the interest of neither the group nor the individual group members (i.e.
α > nβ > β).
5For all studies the original data were either included as an appendix or supplied by the authors. Average
contributions are computed holding constant other features of the experiment such as MPCR, subjects’
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With the exception of Goeree et al. (2002) who use one-shot games, all studies
use repeated VCM games. In most studies group composition does not change across
periods (partners matching protocol). In Carpenter (2007) groups are randomly re-
formed at the beginning of each new period (strangers matching protocol). Group
size effects are studied by varying the number of players matched in a group. In all
studies group sizes are varied in a between-subject design, except in Goeree et al.
(2002) who use a within-subject design. Most studies have investigated group size
effects using groups of 4 or more players. An exception is Goeree et al. (2002) who
compare groups with 2 and 4 players.6
Most studies report a positive effect of group size on cooperation. The effect seems
stronger in settings where the MPCR is low. The reported effect is not always statis-
tically significant, although in some cases this may reflect our conservative testing
procedure. In the studies where subjects interact repeatedly we treat groups in which
subjects interact as a single observation, resulting in a small effective sample size. For
example, the averages reported for Carpenter (2007) are based on 2100 choices (210
subjects × 10 periods), but only 13 independent groups. It is therefore not surprising
that the large observed effect is insignificant.7 In some cases, increasing group size is
found to reduce average contributions (e.g., in Goeree et al. 2002, or when comparing
40- and 100-person groups in Isaac et al. 1994), although these negative effects are
always statistically insignificant.
Overall, the picture that emerges from previous studies is that group size has a
moderate, positive effect on cooperation in VCM games. This conclusion is rein-
forced by the meta-analysis results reported by Zelmer (2003). She uses data from 27
VCM experiments conducted using different parameterizations and procedures, and
finds a positive and significant (at the 10 % level) effect of group size on contribu-
tions. In the next section we describe a new experiment comparing four- and eight-
person VCMs across low and high MPCR conditions, as in several previous studies,
and extend the design to study group size effects in smaller two- and three-person
groups.
experience with the VCM (for the Isaac et al. 1984 study), and subject pool (for the Goeree et al. 2002
study). To assess group size effects we apply the same methods as we use below in our own data—two-
sided Fisher’s randomization tests treating average contributions in each group across all periods as the
unit of observation (see Moir 1998 for a discussion of the randomization test). Exceptions are Goeree et al.
(2002) one-shot within-subject experiment, where we treat individual average contributions as the unit of
observation, and Carpenter (2007) strangers matching protocol experiment, where we use average contri-
butions in a session as the unit of observation. Isaac et al. (1984) have insufficient number of independent
groups to conduct meaningful tests.
6Goeree et al. (2002) study experiments where each token contributed to the group account generates an
‘internal’ return to the individual contributing it and an ‘external’ return to the other group members. In
Table 1 we use data from their treatments 2 and 6, where ‘internal’ and ‘external’ returns are the same as
in a standard VCM experiment.
7Carpenter uses regression methods to analyze his data and finds a significant group size effect when
contributions are regressed on a group size dummy along with other explanatory variables. However he
does not report separate regressions for separate MPCRs. Applying his regression model to the different
MPCR treatments separately we found the group size dummy to be significant at the 1 % level for both
MPCR values.
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Table 1 Group size effects in previous VCM experiments
Study MPCR Group size (average contribution
as % of endowment)
Statistical significance
Isaac et al. (1984)
(inexperienced subjects)
0.3 4 (27 %); 10 (33 %) n.a.
0.75 4 (65 %); 10 (65 %) n.a.
Isaac et al. (1984)
(experienced subjects)
0.3 4 (12 %); 10 (34 %) n.a.
0.75 4 (50 %); 10 (54 %) n.a.
Isaac and Walker
(1988)
0.3 4 (13 %); 10 (29 %) ∗∗
0.75 4 (50 %); 10 (46 %) n.s.
Isaac et al. (1994) 0.3 4 (18 %); 10 (26 %); 4 vs. 10 n.s.; 4 vs. 40∗∗; 4
vs. 100∗∗ 10 vs. 40∗∗; 10
vs. 100∗ 40 vs.100 n.s.
40 (44 %); 100 (40 %)
0.75 4 (43 %); 10 (44 %); any comparison: n.s.
40 (39 %); 100 (38 %)
Goeree et al. (2002)
(UVA subject pool)
0.8 2 (48 %); 4 (39 %) n.s.
Goeree et al. (2002)
(USC subject pool)
0.8 2 (50 %); 4 (45 %) n.s.
Carpenter (2007) 0.375 5 (37 %); 10 (54 %) n.s.
0.75 5 (50 %); 10 (70 %) n.s.
Weimann et al. (2012) 0.02 60 (11 %); 100 (13 %) ∗∗
0.04 60 (20 %); 100 (23 %) ∗
Levels of statistical significance are based on two-sided Fisher’s randomization tests (see footnote 5 for
details). ∗∗ = significant at the 5 % level; ∗ = significant at the 10 % level; n.s. = not significant; n.a. =
insufficient number of independent observations for a meaningful test
3 Experimental design and procedures
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham using the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and 364 student subjects from a wide range of disciplines,
recruited through the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Multiple ses-
sions were conducted and no participant took part in more than one session.
At the beginning of each session participants were randomly matched into groups
that remained the same for the whole experiment. Participants did not know the iden-
tities of the other subjects in the room with whom they were grouped. They were
given instructions for the experiment (reproduced in the Electronic Supplementary
Material) and these were read aloud by the experimenter. Any questions were an-
swered by the experimenter in private, and no communication between participants
was allowed. No information passed across groups during the entire session.
All groups played a ten-period VCM game. In each period, players received an
endowment of 20 tokens and had to choose how many to allocate to a public account
and how many to keep in a private account. A player earned α points for each token
she kept in her private account, and β points from each token allocated to the public
account (regardless of which group member had contributed it). At the end of the
period players were informed of the decisions and earnings of each group member.
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Table 2 Experiment design
Treatment MPCR Group
size
Number of
sessions
Number of
subjects
Number of independent
observations
LOW_4 0.3 4 3 36 9
LOW_8 0.3 8 5 80 10
HIGH_2 0.75 2 3 36 18
HIGH_3 0.75 3 5 60 20
HIGH_4 0.75 4 6 72 18
HIGH_8 0.75 8 5 80 10
Across sessions we varied the MPCR from contributions to the group account
and the number of players matched into a group. In our LOW_4 and LOW_8 treat-
ments we used a low MPCR (β/α = 3/10) and subjects played the VCM game
in four- and eight-person groups, respectively. In four other treatments we used a
high MPCR (β/α = 3/4) and subject played the VCM game either in two-person
groups (HIGH_2 treatment), three-person groups (HIGH_3), four-person groups
(HIGH_4), or eight-person groups (HIGH_8). Table 2 summarizes the experiment
design and provides details on the number of sessions, subjects and independent ob-
servations for each treatment.
At the end of a session the accumulated point earnings from all periods were con-
verted into cash at a rate of £0.003 (£0.0075) per point in the low (high) MPCR
treatments.8 Participants’ earnings ranged from £4.60 to £30.25, averaging £12.09,
for sessions lasting between 30 and 60 minutes.
4 Results
Figure 1 shows average contributions (as percentage of endowment) in the six treat-
ments across the ten periods of the experiment. Consistent with previous studies, in
our low-MPCR treatments we observe a positive effect of group size on cooperation:
averaging across all periods, contributions are 23 % of endowment in LOW_8 and
11 % in LOW_4. The difference is significant at the 1 % level (p = 0.003).9
This positive and significant effect of group size is already evident in the first
period where contributions are higher in LOW_8 than LOW_4 (52 % vs. 40 %, p =
0.042). This suggests that the positive effect of group size operates through a shift in
cooperative intentions. On the other hand, group size does not seem to have a negative
effect on the ability of groups to sustain cooperative outcomes: contributions steadily
decline across periods in both treatments and are equally low in the last period of the
experiment (2.7 % in LOW_8 and 0.3 % LOW_4, p = 0.182).
8The different exchange rates across our low- and high-MPCR treatments ensure that subjects can earn the
same amount of British Pounds by keeping all their tokens in the private account.
9Here, and throughout the rest of the paper, p-values are based on two-sided Fisher’s randomization test
applied to group-level data unless otherwise noted.
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Fig. 1 Average contributions across periods
Table 3 Effects of group size on contributions
(1) (2)
LOW MPCR HIGH MPCR
Group Size 7.25∗∗ −0.54
(3.24) (2.95)
Period −10.63∗∗∗ −2.42
(3.47) (1.85)
Group Size ∗ Period −0.11 −1.14∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.31)
1 if Last Period −7.26 −52.86∗∗∗
(6.47) (9.72)
Constant 6.16 122.93∗∗∗
(21.80) (16.98)
N. 1160 2480
Tobit regressions. Dependent variable is subject’s contribution as percentage of endowment. Robust stan-
dard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation in parentheses (a subject’s group is used as the independent
clustering unit). ∗0.05 ≤ p < 0.10; ∗∗0.01 ≤ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
We examine these effects of group size on contributions using a Tobit regression of
contributions on the variable Group Size, the variable Period, an interaction between
the two variables, a dummy variable taking value 1 for contributions made in the last
period of the experiment, and a constant. The regression (reported in column 1 of
Table 3) shows that, while group size has a significantly positive effect on first-period
contributions, it does not have a significant effect on the decay of contributions over
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time since the coefficient on “Group Size ∗ Period” is negative but insignificantly
different from zero.
A different picture emerges in our high-MPCR treatments. Figure 1 suggests that
there group size affects cooperation mainly through its impact on the stability of con-
tributions, and has only a modest effect on initial contributions. In fact, Fig. 1 shows
that contributions are similar across treatments in the first period (HIGH_2: 77 %;
HIGH_3: 71 %; HIGH_4: 74 %; HIGH_8: 77 %).10 Between periods 2 and 9 con-
tributions remain fairly stable in HIGH_2, whereas they steadily decline in HIGH_3,
HIGH_4 and HIGH_8, with a more pronounced downward trend in HIGH_8. In all
treatments there is a noticeable drop in contributions in the last period of the ex-
periment, where contributions are again similar across treatments (HIGH_2: 27 %;
HIGH_3: 25 %; HIGH_4: 31 %; HIGH_8: 19 %).11 Column 2 of Table 3 confirms
that the decline in contributions is more pronounced in larger groups. Moreover, the
regression shows that group size has an insignificant effect on first-period contribu-
tions.
A consequence of this is that average contributions tend to decrease in group size
in the high-MPCR treatments. Averaging across all periods, contributions are highest
in HIGH_2 (72 %) and lowest in HIGH_8 (49 %), with contributions in HIGH_3 and
HIGH_4 taking intermediate values (55 % and 65 %, respectively). The difference
in contributions between HIGH_2 and HIGH_8 is significant at the 1 % level (p =
0.004). We also detect significant differences between HIGH_2 and HIGH_3 (p =
0.039), and HIGH_4 and HIGH_8 (p = 0.071). We do not find significant differences
in contributions between HIGH_3 and HIGH_4 (p = 0.239), HIGH_2 and HIGH_4
(p = 0.388), or HIGH_3 and HIGH_8 (p = 0.511). These findings suggest that group
size has a predominantly negative effect on cooperation when the MPCR is high
and particularly when group size is small. In larger groups of size four or more the
negative effect of group size is less evident, but it still tends to dominate any positive
effect stemming from the increased social benefits of a contribution.
5 Conclusions
Findings from previous experiments show a variety of group size effects that influ-
ence cooperation. The existing literature on group size effects in voluntary contri-
bution mechanism (VCM) has typically uncovered a moderate, positive relation be-
tween the number of contributors and average contributions. This positive effect of
group size on cooperation may result from the increased social benefits of cooperating
in larger groups. On the other hand, several previous studies on n-person prisoner’s
dilemma or oligopoly experiments find that larger groups face more difficulties in
sustaining cooperative outcomes.
Our study shows that the negative relationship between group size and cooperation
observed in other social dilemma and oligopoly experiments can also be observed in
VCM experiments. In our high marginal per capita return (MPCR) treatments, we find
10In any bilateral comparison the difference in contributions is not statistically significant (p > 0.309).
11Again, the differences are not statistically significant in any bilateral comparison (p > 0.192).
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that cooperation is highest in two-person groups and lowest in eight-person groups.
However, our experiment also shows that, as in previous studies, the positive effect
of group size on cooperation may dominate the negative effect: in our low MPRC
treatments, we find that eight-person groups are significantly more cooperative than
four-person groups.
We interpret these results as suggesting that similar group size effects operate in
prisoner’s dilemmas, oligopoly and VCM settings. In particular, an increase in group
size can have both positive and negative effects. Whether the positive or negative
effect is observed in VCMs depends on how conducive the VCM environment is to
cooperation. In environments that are favorable to cooperation, there may be limited
scope for a positive effect of group size on the already high levels of cooperation,
and the negative effects of group size may be more evident. The positive effect of
group size may be instead more evident in environments that induce low levels of
cooperation.
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